EDITOR’S NOTE: In the interest of disclosure, Schansberg is a declared candidate for the 9th District Congressional seat in Southern Indiana in the 2008 election.



On the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the War in Iraq, it’s worth a look at what we’ve accomplished and what it has cost us.

The best news is that we toppled Saddam Hussein and his brutal regime in six weeks. We won “the war” easily.

But since then, we’ve been trying to “build a nation” in Iraq — a much more difficult task, with uncertain benefits and substantial costs in terms of lives and money.

A more sobering cost is that our efforts in the Middle East since the Persian Gulf War have almost certainly encouraged more terrorism. This is the thesis of a 2005 book by University of Chicago political science professor, Robert Pape: Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. Pape’s study is based on the 315 acts of suicide terrorism (ST) worldwide between 1980 and 2003.

Since many suicide attacks have been done by Muslims, it’s easy to assume that ST is a “Muslim fundamentalist” thing. But Pape finds that this characteristic is involved in only about half of the cases. The leading instigators of ST — nearly one-fourth of the cases — are the Tamil Tigers, a secular group in Sri Lanka. Even among Muslims who engage in ST, about one-third of them are secular.

If religion is not the primary cause, then what is? Pape’s most profound observations relate to the “strategic logic” of ST. First, all acts of ST have been committed by a weaker group against a much stronger military force. They believe that traditional warfare — and even guerilla warfare — will be ineffective.

Second, almost all acts of ST have been committed against democracies. This form of government is seen as more vulnerable or “soft” politically (as opposed to dictatorships).

Third, and most important, acts of ST have always been connected to a perception that the stronger power is occupying the weaker party’s territory. (This is the weaker party’s perception — regardless of the stronger party’s motive.) ST then is primarily a nationalistic response to a foreign power’s control over its land.

That said, religious differences can make ST more likely. They lead to more fear that the occupiers intend to transform their culture. It is easier to demonize “the pagans”. And it is easier to transform a taboo like suicide into something glorified like martyrdom. As Pape puts it: “Religion matters, but mainly in the context of national resistance.”

Some people argue that Al-Queda attacks us because they hate us or our culture. But we’ve had a similar culture for 40 years. And Al-Queda’s attacks coincide with our significant (and seemingly unending) troop presence in the Persian Gulf. We averaged nearly 700 troops in the 1980s. But in the 10 years after the Persian Gulf War, we averaged nearly 7,000.

Moreover, this is the primary reason Bin Laden gives for fighting us: “There is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land.” Bin Laden is upset that all six Gulf States are occupied by American military bases. While he may have other motives, this is the core of his public case for support.

ST is not just a 9/11 thing. The horrible events of 9/11 are easiest to remember. But Hezbollah used ST to kill 243 Marines and drive the U.S. out of Lebanon. Palestinian terrorists have used it to try to force Israel from the West Bank and Gaza. The Tamil Tigers have used it to encourage an independent Tamil homeland. And Al-Queda is using it to pressure us to leave the Persian Gulf region.

At minimum, understanding Pape’s work is helpful in trying to understand the issues. His policy conclusions are not those of an ideologue. He is not digging for reasons to leave the region and is actually quite open to staying—as long we understand all of the significant costs involved.

But Pape observes the difficulties inherent in defeating current terrorists without creating conditions that will encourage more terrorism. And he leaves his readers with this warning: “The sustained presence of heavy American combat forces in Muslim countries is likely to increase the odds of the next 9/11.” Is that a cost we really want to pay?

Eric Schansberg is professor of economics at Indiana University Southeast and an adjunct scholar for the Indiana Policy Review. He is the author of “Turn Neither to the Right nor to the Left: A Thinking Christian’s Guide to Politics and Public Policy” and the editor of SchansBlog.com.